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Abstract 
When preparing the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP), Member States 
were supported by the European Commission but denied the EU a competence in the 
matter. Currently, the Treaty of Lisbon identifies territorial cohesion as a competence 
shared between the Union and the Member States. This paper is about the process 
architecture of territorial cohesion policy. In the past, this architecture resembled the 
Open Method of Coordination (OMC) which the White Paper on European Governance 
praised, but only in areas where there was no EU competence. This reflected zero-sum 
thinking which may continue even under the Lisbon Treaty. After all, for as long as 
territorial cohesion was not a competence, voluntary cooperation as practiced in the 
ESDP process was pursued in this way. However, the practice of EU policies, even in 
areas where there is an EU competence, often exhibits features of the OMC. Surprisingly 
effective innovations hold the promise of rendering institutions of decision making 
comprehensible and democratically accountable. In the EU as a functioning polity 
decision making is thus at least part deliberative so that actors’ preferences are 
transformed by the force of the better argument. This brings into focus the socialisation 
of the deliberators into epistemic communities. Largely an informal process, this is 
reminiscent of European spatial planning having been characterised as a learning process. 
                                                           
1 Based on an award-winning paper offered under the same title at the Regional Studies Association Annual 
International Conference 2010, Monday 24
th – Wednesday 26
th May, Pécs, Southern Hungary, ‘Regional Responses 
and Global Shifts: Actors, Institutions and Organisations’. See: http://www.regional-studies-
assoc.ac.uk/events/2010/may-pecs-papers.asp.  
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“Existing procedures and instruments must be analysed to explore to 
what extent they can be beneficial to the achievement of Territorial 
Cohesion or how they could be developed further by integrating 
Territorial Cohesion objectives. Co-ordination mechanisms may need 
to be added but should be assessed on the balance of value added and 
bureaucratic burden” (The Territorial Cohesion Principles. Position 
paper to the EU Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion. Hanover: 
Akademie für Raumforschung und Landesplanung 2008, p. 13). 
Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to make constructive proposals for the future process architecture 
of EU territorial cohesion policy. As the above quote suggests, it is based on a critical 
appreciation of developments over the past twenty years. It also recalibrates the author’s 
previous recommendations to suit the current situation, including the coming into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty, but also, and in particular, the ‘heavy weather’ in which cohesion 
policy currently finds itself. 
 
When Member States were preparing the European Spatial Development Perspective 
(ESDP), the European Commission was merely in a supportive role. The Treaty of 
Lisbon identifies territorial cohesion as a competence shared between the Union and the 
Member States. Part 1 reminds the reader of these developments. It points out also that 
the Council of Ministers may still reject Commission proposals, if any, to effectuate any 
shared competence, including that for territorial cohesion. Invoking the principle of 
subsidiarity, recently a blocking minority has put a soil directive on hold. This reflects 
zero-sum thinking, as if any ‘supranational’ EU competence represented a clean loss for 
Member States. Following Zeitlin, De la Pochet and Magnusson (eds. 2005), Heidenreich 
and Zeitlin (eds. 2009) and Sabel and Zeitlin (eds. 2010), Part 2 introduces the Open 
Method of Coordination (OMC) transcending the distinction between supranational and 
intergovernmental approaches, in the past always treated as a given. Part 3 recounts 
earlier proposals (Faludi 2004, 2005, 2007; see also ARL 2004) concerning the 
application of the OMC. Part 4 adapts them to suit the current situation. Taking note, 
amongst other things, of the rise to prominence of EU macro-regional strategies, and also 
of the timetable leading up to the next Financial Framework, Part 5 provides a road map 
up to 2014 while the epilogue reflects on the implications of a number of surprisingly 
effective innovations in EU governance of which the OMC is only a part. 
Part 1: Territorial Cohesion a Shared Competence 
Cohesion policy became a serious business under Jacques Delors. This was to form the 
backdrop to the ESDP which to the present day remains the most pronounced of all the 
European spatial planning documents. The initiative came from French and Dutch 
planners ‘in cahoots’ with Commission officials from DG REGIO – at that time still 
going under the label of DG XVI – who advocated a spatial framework for cohesion 
policy. However, the European treaties were deemed to give the EU no competence in the 
matter. The solution proposed by the Germans was for a framework to be formulated by 
the Member States. The Commission acquiesced in the vain hope that a constructive   5
attitude would gain it enough trust from Member States for them to allow it to play the 
role which it considered necessary.  
 
After a long gestation period (Faludi, Waterhout 2002), the ESDP saw the light of day in 
1999. To the present day the Commission continues to invoke it. A gratifying early 
mention was in the White Paper on European Governance holding up the ‘spatial 
approach’ in the ESDP – standing for coordinating policies within a spatial framework – 
as an example of good governance. However, the Commission ceased supporting any 
intergovernmental follow-up to the ESDP. Placing territorial, alongside economic and 
social cohesion in the Constitution which would give the Commission the right of 
initiative, was an idea formulated in the confident expectation that the Constitution would 
sail through the ratification process. Member States could thus expect to find themselves 
at the receiving end of an, as yet unspecified, EU territorial cohesion policy.  
 
Territorial cohesion as a concept had become popular under the Commissioner for 
Regional Policy Michel Barnier. He had represented the Commission on the Presidium of 
the Convention on the Future of Europe. The Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe had thus come to include territorial cohesion. Its ups and downs – and those of 
the Lisbon Treaty replacing it – formed the background to the formulation, once again in 
intergovernmental manner, but this time without Commission support, of a follow-up to 
the ESDP, the Territorial Agenda of the European Union (Faludi 2009a,b). The initiative 
was taken in the reasonable expectation of the Commission obtaining the right of 
initiative in matters of territorial cohesion. Indeed, Barnier’s successor, Polish 
Commissioner Danuta Hübner, announced at an informal meeting of ministers of the 
Member States in Luxembourg (2005) the coming of a White Paper on territorial 
cohesion, usually a step towards making legislative proposals.  
 
This was when the Commission was preparing the Financial Framework 2007-2013 and 
when it put cohesion policy in the service of the Lisbon Strategy. Drafts of what would 
become the Community Strategic Guidelines for Cohesion anticipated that territorial 
cohesion would become part of the equation.  
 
The French and Dutch referenda of mid-2005 undoubtedly threw a whole set of ‘spanners 
in the works’. The Commission was in disarray and, having begun to get used to the 
notion of an EU territorial cohesion policy, the national planning establishments, too, 
must have been bewildered. Promulgating the Territorial Agenda in 2007, when it was 
expected that, in albeit modified form the Constitution would be revived, they asked for 
clarification of Commission intentions. The latter issued a Green Paper on Territorial 
Cohesion in late-2008, by which time it had become clear that, as regards territorial 
cohesion, the Lisbon Treaty would be a carbon copy of the Constitution. So once more 
the cards seemed to be stacked in favour of the Commission, but the Green Paper made 
no bid for anything like a strong territorial cohesion policy. Perhaps the desire not to rock 
the boat during the sensitive process of ratifying the Treaty of Lisbon was responsible. 
Changes in key personnel also meant that past ambitions to this effect had faded. Perhaps 
more importantly, cohesion policy as such had become controversial. Already in 2003-
2005, some net-contributors to the budget led by the UK had argued for its   6
‘renationalisation’, shorthand for a number of changes that would have emasculated 
cohesion policy, and in particular the role of the Commission in the multi-level 
governance setup that is one of its key-features. If not in any fundamental reform, then 
this resulted at least in the commitment to review cohesion policy for the period after 
2013, a review that is now taking place. Rather than emphasising the aspect of territorial 
cohesion simply sustaining cohesion policy as such became the Commission’s priority. 
In all this it is relevant to appreciate that the ESDP, the Territorial Agenda and also the 
Green Paper were always minority concerns for national planning establishments and the 
relevant sections at DG REGIO, with national governments, let alone the Commission as 
such being far less committed. Those concerned with spatial planning/territorial cohesion 
at whatever level had thus better form a coalition to increase their joint sway over well-
endowed sectors notorious for pursuing their policies without due regard to any spatial 
effects. Zero-sum thinking, as if the EU gaining a competence in the matter would 
necessarily be at the expense of national planning establishments and vice versa has thus 
far prevented the actors concerned from drawing this conclusion. 
 
Supported by an assortment of EU institutions and regional lobbies, planners availed 
themselves of the opportunity of making their voices heard during the consultations on 
the Green Paper. The threat over the renationalisation of cohesion policy as such was also 
addressed. Naturally, being positive about integration, for which it is an important 
instrument, EU institutions were supportive of cohesion policy generally and of territorial 
cohesion policy in particular. The European Parliament and the Committee of the 
Regions both argued for a White Paper on territorial cohesion, thus signalling their belief 
in the need for legislative proposals. The European Parliament identified territorial 
governance as a pillar of cohesion policy. Similarly, the Economic and Social Committee 
asked for territorial strategies as platforms for good governance. Having coined the term 
territorial cohesion, the Assembly of European Regions was also supportive. The Council 
of Peripheral and Maritime Regions welcomed the assertion of solidarity and cohesion 
and asked for a Europe-wide debate on territorial cohesion, yet again based on a White 
Paper. Predictably, Member State reactions were however diverse. France was positive, 
the defender of intergovernmental planning, Germany, sceptical, and the UK as the key 
advocate of renationalisation in the past saw little mileage in territorial cohesion. Once a 
trailblazer, European planning had slipped to the bottom of the Dutch agenda, so the 
Netherlands reaction was also lukewarm. Unencumbered by the past, Hungary in charge 
of the review of the Territorial Agenda due in 2011 was enthusiastic about territorial 
cohesion policy, seeing it as a continuation of the ESDP process, and so was the largest 
new Member State, Poland.  
 
The Commission discussed how to react, but eventually the Sixth Progress Report on 
Cohesion gave no more than a summary of the consultations. The first Barroso 
Commission was drawing to its conclusion. Meanwhile  the second Barroso Commission 
has taken shape with the Austrian Johannes Hahn as Commissioner for Regional Policy. 
The Fifth Cohesion Report is in the making, the successor to the Lisbon Strategy, Europe 
2020, is due to be finalised in June 2010 and a High Level Group on cohesion policy is 
deliberating with a view to holding a Cohesion Forum in December 2010.  
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Thankfully, the Communication from the Commission preparing Europe 2020 at least 
goes as far as reiterating that territorial cohesion will take its place alongside  social 
cohesion as an objective of the EU. While the high politics thus continues to pay cursory 
attention at best – to whether or not the Commission should be allowed to set targets a 
question of the distribution of power takes priority – the sub-committee on Territorial 
Cohesion and Urban Matters of the Coordination Committee of the Funds (COCOF) at 
the European Commission is attempting to give shape to territorial cohesion policy under 
the Lisbon Treaty. The intergovernmental Territorial Agenda process, too, is beginning to 
focus on the new situation in which, at least formally speaking, the Commission may 
hold sway over territorial cohesion policy. So there is an array of formal as well as 
informal initiatives in place on which to build. 
 
Before continuing, it is relevant to reiterate that unlike competences, such as the customs 
union, which are exclusive to the Union, a shared competence means that, for as long as 
the Union does not exercise it, the competence remains with the Member States. A shared 
competence thus invites zero-sum thinking like that specifically exhibited by the actors in 
the ESDP process. So in making proposals, if any, to effectuate the shared competence 
for territorial cohesion, the Commission must bear in mind that the Council of Ministers, 
representing the governments of the Member States, might reject them. The cool German 
reaction to the Green Paper may give a foretaste of things to come. The fact that this 
reaction came, not from the planners, but from the Ministry of Economic Affairs is 
illustration of the fact that, even if they wanted to take a positive attitude, national 
planners have always to take account of the attitudes of other actors. Positions taken on 
the Council thus reflect the internal balance of power which in the German, as well as in 
a number of other cases, may be stacked against any concrete steps in matters of 
territorial cohesion policy. True, cohesion policy, and with it territorial cohesion policy, 
now come under Qualitative Majority Voting, but German opposition cannot be taken 
lightly, especially since, even if for other reasons – its opposition to cohesion policy as 
such continuing in its present from – the UK, too, may reject any proposal. Ominously, 
both Germany and the UK formed part of the blocking minority against the recent soil 
directive. 
 
It is not only Member States that engage in zero-sum thinking. Even though bestowing 
praise on it, the 2001 White Paper on European Governance said that the ‘Open Method 
of Coordination’ (OMC) – still to be discussed – was only applicable where there was no 
EU competence. Relying on voluntary compliance, the OMC was seen as a second-best 
alternative to be applied only where the EU had not been granted full rights. Responsible 
for the White Paper and, as reported, also for introducing territorial cohesion as a shared 
competence into the Constitution, Barnier thus seemed to have wanted to exclude the 
option of it becoming the object of the OMC. That this might after all have watered down 
the influence of the Commission under the Community method, was apparently the 
thinking. Since then, on various occasions DG REGIO staunchly opposed the application 
of the OMC in this area proposed by the French Délegation à l’aménagement du 
territoire et à l’action régionale (DATAR) and also the German Academy for Spatial 
Research and Planning (ARL 2004). A negative attitude towards invoking the OMC was 
also true for others among those putting their money on a competence for territorial   8
cohesion. The expert Peter Schmeitz (2005) even wanted to ban any talk about the OMC. 
Advocating a White Paper implying legislative proposals for effectuating the 
competence, the Polish reaction to the Green Paper, too, without much ado rejected the 
OMC. If you are in favour of EU territorial cohesion policy, you must apparently be 
against the OMC. On a more fundamental level, Philippe Doucet (2010, 263) holds the 
sophisticated and unending rhetoric on the merits of the OMC responsible for diverting 
attention ‘[…] away from tackling the EU key dilemma: a strong European federation, or 
a club of independent dwarf states?’. 
 
De la Porte and Pochet (2002) posit, however, that the debate between a supranational 
and an intergovernmental logic is sterile. The intergovernmental logic underlines the – 
undisputed – truth that the Member States are sovereign. However, the very rationale of 
the EU is that, intermeshing their sovereign powers, nation-states strengthen their joint 
control over a rapidly changing world. Nugent (2003, 478) thus concludes that ‘[…] the 
discussion about national sovereignty […] is no longer meaningful’, but neither is talk of 
a European federation, let alone a superstate, replacing the nation-states. Rather, the EU 
is often described as something new, a point to which the paper returns later.   
Part 2: Beyond Zero-Sum Thinking  
The search is thus on for a way of overcoming this zero-sum thinking, with the OMC an 
element in the equation. OMC is a label given subsequently to practices emerging already 
after the Treaty of Maastricht. The latter had created European Monetary Union, but 
complementary policy areas remained Member State prerogatives. This problem – one 
that is still with us, witness the current commotion over the fate of the euro – was 
addressed, albeit hesitantly. The Treaty of Maastricht itself had gone at least as far as 
introducing the figure of indicative Broad Economic Policy Guidelines. Also, the 
Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development had started to flag differences, 
not only in economic policy, but also in the performance of its European members in the 
area of employment, and there was growing concern about the effects on Europe’s 
competitiveness. For this reason, social security and pensions were in the limelight. The 
subsequent Treaty of Amsterdam thus foresaw in a European Employment Strategy 
which, rather than coming under the control of the Commission, a move against which 
there was the usual opposition, rested on mutual surveillance and peer reviews (Visser 
2009, 38-39). From this sprung the OMC in its many variations designed to overcome 
zero-sum thinking. It received the label OMC at the time of the adoption by the European 
Council of the Lisbon Strategy in 2000. 
 
Heidenreich and Zeitlin (2009, 1-2) identify its core feature as iterative benchmarking of 
national progress towards common European objectives and organised mutual learning. 
Variations notwithstanding, there are four common elements: joint definition by Member 
States and the Commission of objectives, indicators and often also of guidelines and 
targets; national action plans or strategy reports proposing where necessary reforms are 
suited to the domestic situation; peer reviews and exchanges of good practices, 
sometimes backed up by recommendations from the Commission and the Council; re-
elaboration of the national plans and, less frequently, of the entire European framework 
in light of experiences gained. Examples here include the labour participation rate which   9
is considered too low in Europe, as well as the percentage of GDP spent on research and 
innovation. Differences notwithstanding – indicators played a less prominent role, a point 
to which this paper will return – the features of the OMC immediately remind us of the 
ESDP process and its follow-ups often identified as exercises in mutual learning. 
 
The most prominent example of the OMC currently being applied is in the governance of 
the Lisbon Strategy. Zeitlin (2009a) shows that the OMC subsequently extended across 
an ever broader set of policies relating to domestically sensitive areas where – as in 
spatial planning or territorial cohesion policy – diversity precluded harmonisation and 
encouraged mutual learning. However, the Lisbon Strategy was also severely criticised 
for its lack of strategic focus and multiplication of objectives, targets, and coordination 
processes. In particular it was argued that the OMC had failed to deliver Member State 
commitment to the implementation of agreed reforms. Having been involved in multiple 
exercises of reviewing success and failure in respect of OMC, Zeitlin gives a more 
nuanced verdict. Accordingly, the OMC should be considered a qualified success in some 
fields, while no real judgment can be reached in others where the method had not yet 
been fully implemented.  
 
This is not the time or place to discuss the performance of the OMC in detail. Zeitlin 
(2009b) sees substantive changes in national policy thinking, national policy agendas and 
also specific national policies resulting from its application. In other words, like the 
ESDP, in practice the application of the OMC leads to mutual learning. Other effects on 
which there is even broader agreement are procedural: reinforced horizontal coordination, 
improvements in national steering capacity, enhanced vertical coordination, increased 
involvement of non-state actors, and new networks of non-state and sub-national actors in 
EU policy making. Concerning the institutional architecture of the OMC, Zeitlin (2009a) 
lays out five principles that reflect his assessment of the successful procedural 
innovations identified above: enhancing policy coherence; improving horizontal 
coherence without sacrificing core policy objectives; ensuring autonomy, specificity and 
visibility of sectoral processes; promoting mutual learning and evidence-based policy 
making through consistent reporting against common indicators, diagnostic monitoring, 
peer review, and evaluation of different national approaches to achieving common 
objectives; mobilising commitment and participation by Member State governments, 
national publics and other stakeholders. Anyone who is knowledgeable of the ESDP and 
its follow-ups will quickly perceive similarities here.  
 
Invoking the OMC in territorial cohesion policy thus seems attractive. However, a key 
feature, league tables based on the application of indicators measuring the achievement in 
terms of agreed goals, will be less prominent. Identifying the specific characteristics of an 
area in its wider context is more important. Next to hard comparisons, this requires the 
ability to appreciate unique challenges and opportunities arising. The point is not to do 
this in isolation but in a collaborative exercise of mutual learning. Such are the 
implications of the OMC as applied to territorial cohesion policy. 
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Discussing the application of the OMC in urban policy, Atkinson (2002, 788) was the 
first to point out, in an aside, that not only urban policy, but the ESDP process too, 
represented the OMC avant la lettre. Indeed, the ESDP has been prepared, not by the 
Commission but by a ‘Committee on Spatial Development’ chaired by the Member State 
holding the rotating EU Presidency. At the same time, however, as indicated, it was not 
purely a matter for the Member States. The Commission not only gave logistic support, it 
had the only permanent seat on the management committee, the so-called ‘troika’. Also, 
its Communications ‘Europe 2000’ and ‘Europe 2000+’ helped shape the agenda, and the 
ESDP was given the nod, not only by the ministers of the Member States, but also by the 
Commissioner for Regional Policy, at the time the German, Monika Wulf-Mathies. So 
rather than being an intergovernmental document, the ESDP process was a hybrid, and 
this it has in common with the OMC.  
 
The follow-up, too, was, and still is, complex. Whilst the Commission was financing the 
Community initiative INTERREG elaborating upon ESDP themes, as mentioned 
previously, it was the Member States that prepared the follow-up entitled the Territorial 
Agenda. Although this happened strictly without Commission support, the Commissioner 
for Regional Policy and her entourage were present at the informal meetings of ministers 
deliberating on drafts and, as indicated, the Commission subsequently prepared its Green 
Paper on Territorial Cohesion to which the Member States, together with hundreds of 
other stakeholders reacted. In parallel to the Green Paper and the consultations on it, 
working groups chaired by representatives of various Member States explored themes 
identified in the First Action Programme formulated in the wake of the Territorial 
Agenda. Once more, DG REGIO and occasionally also other interested DGs attended, 
and this practice continues, always depending on the initiative of one or more Member 
State(s) chairing the working groups concerned. Also, since the adoption of the 
Territorial Agenda, regular meetings of the newly formed Network of Territorial 
Cohesion Contact Points (NTCCP) have taken place. They, too, are attended by DG 
REGIO representatives. Finally, the future of EU territorial cohesion policy post-2013 is 
never far from the minds of the working group preparing the review of the Territorial 
Agenda due to be finalised in 2011. The European Spatial Observation Network 
(ESPON), presently financed under the European Territorial Cooperation objective of 
cohesion policy and producing much of the evidence on which many of these working 
groups draw is a going concern. It, too, holds regular so-called ESPON seminars. So 
there exists then an admittedly somewhat diffuse institutional infrastructure for territorial 
cohesion policy in which the Commission and the Member States share responsibility. 
This is of course what the OMC is about.  
Part 3: The OMC in EU Territorial Cohesion Policy: 
Earlier Proposals 
The fascination with the OMC in this area (Faludi 2004, 2005) began at a time when the 
Constitution seemed to be sailing its way through the ratification process. The estimate 
was however that, even with territorial cohesion as an EU competence, the Commission 
would be unable to formulate relevant policies on its own. It itself lacked – and still lacks 
– adequate resources in terms of personnel. Even with a larger establishment, it would in 
effect be impossible for it to gain anything like the knowledge and insights necessary. For   11
this, the continuous input from the field – Member States, as in the ESDP process, and 
also other stakeholders – seemed essential. Orchestrating their work was what the 
Commission should do, was the argument.  
 
When the Constitution suffered its setback, the present author exclaimed that the OMC 
was needed ‘Now more than ever’ (Faludi 2007). However, the situation has changed. 
Certainly for as long as the Constitution was in abeyance, there seemed no alternative 
than to bank on the Member States whose planners were in the process of preparing the 
Territorial Agenda. The setback that its ambition to gain a competence had suffered 
notwithstanding, it seemed politic for Member States to continue to involve the 
Commission. Not only was there a prospect – proven to be realistic – that something like 
the Constitution with a territorial cohesion article in it would eventually come about, 
much as the Commission needed them, the Member States, more particularly their 
planning establishments, needed the Commission. To reiterate what has been said before, 
planners at whatever level are up against other policy makers, including their sector-
based colleagues. This is a condition of life in planning. Rather than wallowing in zero-
sum thinking, forging a coalition with the Commission, or rather with those elements in it 
favouring territorial cohesion, is a superior strategy.  
 
With the Lisbon Treaty now in force, on the face of it the situation appears to be the same 
as that in 2005, but for the same pragmatic reasons as advanced previously the input of 
the Member States remains essential. In addition, to reiterate a point made before, with 
the future of cohesion policy as such looming larger than territorial cohesion, the position 
of the Commission is shifting. Rather than seeking to hold the Commission at bay, 
national planning establishments thus need to encourage it to take relevant initiatives. 
Otherwise, territorial cohesion might fall by the wayside, with dire consequences for 
planning as such. One can thus once again posit a common interest for planners at the 
level of Member States and the small group concerned within DG REGIO. Whether or 
not this entails invoking the shared competence – as will be evident, the suggestion is to 
do so, but only to support the collaborative process architecture – is secondary. It is on 
this basis that the remainder of this paper seeks to make constructive proposals as to the 
future architecture of EU territorial cohesion policy. 
Part 4: Building Blocks 
The building blocks of the architecture envisaged, involving an active input from the 
Member States as well as the Commission, already exist. Even without the Constitution 
being ratified at the time of their adoption, the Community Strategic Guidelines – still in 
force as they are – considered territories and their makeup as relevant. Accordingly, one  
 
[…] of the features of cohesion policy – in contrast to sectoral policies – lies in its 
capacity to adapt to the particular needs and characteristics of specific geographical 
challenges and opportunities. Under cohesion policy, geography matters. 
Accordingly, when developing their programmes and concentrating resources on 
key priorities, member states and regions should pay particular attention to these 
specific geographical circumstances (Council of the European Union 2006, 40). 
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Understanding the specific geographic circumstances of the area to which a programme 
applies is thus the key. The point has been made before because it distinguishes territorial 
cohesion policy from the application of the OMC in areas where the standard of 
comparison is the achievement of measurable objectives.  
 
Elaborating on what this means in practical terms, the Directorate-General Regional 
Policy (2006, 5) formulated guidelines for the ex-ante evaluation of the National 
Strategic Reference Frameworks (NSRFs) and Operational Programmes (OPs). Under a 
‘territorial cohesion’ heading they should first identify the characteristics and the 
territorial needs of the area concerned and then check the effectiveness of the fit of the 
strategy proposed and the relevant implementation system. Unfortunately, these 
stipulations were not generally followed, neither as regards the NSRFs (Polverari, 
McMaster, Gross, Bachtler, Ferry, Yuill 2006) nor the OPs (Bachtler, Ferry, Ménez, 
McMaster 2007). With the exception of France, only new Member States like Hungary 
and Poland, both  enthusiastic about the concept, invoked territorial cohesion. Hungary in 
particular has fully absorbed the concept (Péti 2009).   
 
That the NSRFs should take account of territorial cohesion was something that was also 
on the wish list of the planners from the Member States preparing the Territorial Agenda. 
However, as it neared completion, the NSRFs were already up and running and so this 
was not pursued further. Whether their owners – in most cases ministries of finance 
and/or economic affairs – would have allowed territorial cohesion to form part of the 
equation is, moreover, a moot point. However, this is the crux: Territorial cohesion policy 
concerns the integration of sector policies, taking account of the specificities of the area 
where they apply. This is like Fabrizio Barca (2009) talking about development policies 
being place-based. If taken seriously, and although promising to render policy more 
efficient and effective, such integration curtails the freedom of sector policy makers to do 
as they please. There is thus a common interest here for those concerned, whether at DG 
REGIO or at the level of Member States, in insisting that spatial or territorial issues be 
taken into account.  
 
All this amounts to reinforcing the proposal, made for the first time in a scenario for the 
application of the OMC in territorial cohesion policy in Faludi (2004), of national 
territorial cohesion strategies capped by an EU Territorial Cohesion Strategy. The latter 
should be part of, or perhaps developed in parallel with, the next Community Strategic 
Guidelines for Cohesion. To draw benefit from their expertise, the Commission should 
once more, as in the Community Strategic Guidelines of 2006, invite Member States to 
formulate national territorial cohesion strategies as part of, or in parallel with, the next 
generation of NSRFs. The existing NTCCP could serve as a conduit.  
 
Although critical of the OMC, perhaps because he sees it as only targeting sector policies, 
Barca makes similar proposals. He foresees a ‘place-based policy group’ at the 
Commission to work for an eighteen-month period starting after the publication of the 
Fifth Cohesion Report in mid-2010. This should be augmented by Member States and 
regions in collaboration with local partners preparing a national strategic assessment of 
territorial challenges and the Commission launching a European strategic development   13
framework with attendant regulatory proposals in earely-2012 leading to decisions on the 
European budget and related issues before the end of that year, in good time for the post-
2013 Financial Framework to get into gear.   
 
To reiterate, during the last round the relevant parts of the Community Strategic 
Guidelines were simply not observed. So, this is one area where EU legislation might 
make a difference in favour of national planners. Under zero-sum thinking they feared 
that an EU competence might cost them influence, but by being called upon to provide 
relevant inputs into the NSRFs, their position relative to other national policy makers 
might in fact improve. Rather than that which under zero-sum thinking they feared, 
namely, that an EU competence might cost them influence by being called upon to 
provide the relevant input into the NSRFs, it is actually now possible that national 
planners might be able to gain something for use in their own national struggles from it.  
In the spirit of the OMC, as described above, any national territorial strategies developed 
would form inputs for the EU Territorial Cohesion Strategy. There should also be mutual 
reviews, the method favoured by the OECD and inherent also in the OMC. The OECD 
has indeed published close to thirty territorial reviews of its members, their regions and 
cities. They involve field visits and reporting by, amongst others, representatives of peer 
review countries culminating in a publication in the series of OECD Territorial Reviews. 
The intention is to generate feedback and adjustment pressures, which is of course what 
the OMC is about.  
 
A further proposal in the previous paper needs also to be further developed. This is to 
create formal occasions for presenting the results of these reviews, occasions that might 
be organised by a permanent EU Territorial Cohesion Forum. In the present situation the 
forum could in fact also host the regular meetings of the NTCCP and the, less frequent, 
informal meetings of ministers that have punctuated the preparation of the ESDP and the 
Territorial Agenda. The EU Territorial Cohesion Forum would provide the opportunity 
also – this being a novelty since a Commission input of this kind had been lacking in the 
past – for presenting an evolving EU Territorial Cohesion Strategy, perhaps prepared by 
the ‘place-based policy group’ proposed by Barca. Be that as it may, the confrontation 
between national strategies and an EU strategy would form a more formal occasion for 
mutual learning, just as in other applications of the OMC, obviously with many informal 
encounters in between.  
 
Rather than being a new institution at Brussels, the Forum would probably be a virtual 
one, a roving circus, as these things are in the EU, but perhaps a permanent secretariat 
coordinating meetings would help. The ESPON Coordination Unit located in 
Luxembourg provides a model for how such a secretariat can energise the multiple 
networks involved. 
 
To return to the substance of the meetings, to make things comparable, in preparing their 
strategies, the Member States should be expected to invoke common territorial cohesion 
indicators. Since the ESDP already suggested this, stipulating that Member States should 
issue regular standardised reports on the spatial development of their national territories, 
this could hardly be seen as an imposition from above, but once more some degree of   14
regulation might help. Much as the OECD does, the Commission might also make 
substantive recommendations to Member States, but these would clearly be ‘soft law’.  
 
At this point it seems apposite to return to the specificities of applying the OMC to 
territorial cohesion policy. The conventional approach, with league tables and the like, 
needs to be adapted. As Barca has been reported to have commented, the OMC has been 
applied to sector policies where indicators of achievement are perhaps easier to invoke. 
To reiterate, performance as regards measurable objectives can help, but is not the core 
issue in assessing territorial strategies. That core issue is the formulation of strategies, or 
perhaps we should call them visions, reflecting the unique configurations of the territories 
concerned. This is what the Community Strategic Guidelines must have meant by saying 
that “geography mattered”. In so doing, in establishing how it is that in each particular 
case geography matters, the territories concerned need to be seen in their wider European 
context. This requires skills in what Williams (1996) has famously described as spatial 
positioning. Spatial positioning cannot be done in splendid isolation, from the inside out, 
so to speak. It requires a thorough look at the territory concerned, analysing its strengths 
and weaknesses from the outside in, so to say.  
 
However, there is no Archimedean Point in this, no overarching authoritative perspective 
that imposes a single outside view. Rather, there can and will be multiple points of view 
of Europe and its territories. The upshot is, once more, that there needs to be dialogue: 
actors at various levels engaging in spatial imagination, looking at Europe from their 
perspectives, but also imagining what Europe as such is or should look like. The formal 
occasions for exchanging this information are the meetings of the EU Territorial 
Cohesion Forum. In total, this enhances the Europeanisation of spatial planning as 
stipulated as an aim in the ESDP. However, rather than standing for more uniformity, it 
will be evident that Europeanisation here stands for recognising the uniqueness of 
territories, what is special about each, what its strengths and weaknesses are, but 
reflecting themes that have been formulated in a wider debate about common challenges 
and responses. It is universally recognised that this is best done from the bottom up. In 
fact, it can only be done in this way. It is only the themes that can and must be set in an 
overall agenda-setting process. 
 
The confrontation of many visions, each valid in its own right, is what this variation of 
OMC would be about. To reiterate, there is unlikely to be one agreed, overall vision, and 
none of the visions would become authoritative, not even the EU Territorial Cohesion 
Strategy put forward by the Commission. An authoritative vision would be quite unlike 
the open-ended character of European integration of which the end-state, both in an 
institutional as well as in a territorial sense, are unknown. Having said this, there must, 
however, be pragmatic medium-term answers to the question of what the territorial 
dimension of ‘Europe 2020’, and in its wake of the next Community Strategic Guidelines 
for Cohesion or their equivalent, should look like. As with all such processes, this will be 
the result of bargaining and compromises. As is well known, planning is politics.    15
Part 5: A Road Map 
The above-mentioned proposals for an institutional architecture bear something of a 
resemblance to the formulation of the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region in which for 
the first time more than a score of Directorates General at the Commission have 
participated. In addition, there was stakeholder involvement with several conferences in 
the area, the whole process resulting in a medium-term Action Plan committing many of 
them to perform specific tasks. Such macro-strategies may be one way forward in 
cohesion policy.  
 
This is not the place to discuss the Baltic Seas Strategy as such but there are two salient 
points of interest here. One is the good news that DGs at the Commission can formulate 
joint strategies, something that has always been on the wish list, recently also of Barca, 
and his desire for a ‘place-based policy group’. Other observers, too, have frequently 
asked for an anchor point for territorial cohesion policy in the Commission structure. If 
cooperation, as exhibited in the Baltic Sea Strategy, was to become common, if DGs 
were to be able to formulate viewpoints in respect of, for instance, the territorial 
dimension of each NSRF, this would give Member States an incentive to take this 
exercise seriously. The same is true for the EU Territorial Cohesion Strategy. However 
broad, if it were to carry the commitment not just of DG REGIO but of the Commission 
as a whole, then this could really be a powerful instrument, and something akin to what 
the Economic and Social Committee and the European Parliament have asked for: a 
platform for integrating policies and a vehicle for good governance.  
 
The second point is that cooperation across territorial jurisdictions is possible, all the 
more so where there is a strong Commission interest resulting in a common point of 
view. The example of the Baltic Sea Strategy could be extended, not only, as is presently 
the case with the Danube Strategy, to other macro-regions, but also to transnational and 
cross-border planning. The essential difference here in respect of conventional 
INTERREG projects is that in each case the Commission would formulate a common 
position, something which admittedly would tax its resources in terms of personnel. The 
point is that, whether on the macro-regional,  transnational or even on the cross-border 
level, such strategies would also be building blocks for the EU Territorial Cohesion 
Strategy proposed. 
 
In conclusion, then, the road map for territorial cohesion policy is this: Given that the 
next Financial Framework needs to be agreed no later than 2012, to be preceded, as Barca 
argued, rather than followed by Community Strategic Guidelines or their functional 
equivalent; given also that drafts of all these documents are scheduled to come out in 
2011 at the latest, it follows that the review of the Territorial Agenda, currently under 
way and due to be completed in good time for a ministerial meeting under the Hungarian 
Presidency in May 2011, is the occasion for Member States to nail their colours to the 
mast of a joint approach. They need to make a constructive move, each providing an 
input into an EU Territorial Cohesion Strategy, which would be designed to form a 
complement to, and perhaps even become incorporated in, the next Community Strategic 
Guidelines. This should be accompanied by the commitment of Member States to 
continue to participate in the development of the same strategy as part of a rolling   16
programme, with each preparing its own territorial cohesion strategy according to a 
common format. There could also be general support and perhaps also concrete proposals 
from the Member States for a ‘light’ EU directive to this effect, requiring these strategies 
to be coordinated with the preparation of the next generation of NSRFs, which would be 
a significant advance for a multi-level territorial cohesion policy.  
Epilogue 
Much has been made in this paper of the sterile nature of  the traditional distinction 
between intergovernmental and supranational approaches and of the seemingly endless 
discussion over the competences of the Member States and the Union. A plausible 
counterargument could be that the Member States are after all the quintessential 
producers of democratic legitimacy. However, discussing novel patterns of rule-making 
common in the EU, Sabel and Zeitlin (2010) invoke the concept of deliberative rather 
than representative democracy. Under this notion, actors’ preferences are, albeit partially 
transformed by the force of the better argument in what they call ‘experimentalist’ 
governance, this being their new umbrella term for the OMC and such like. This brings 
into focus the socialisation of the deliberators into epistemic communities, via their 
participation in committees of experts of various kinds. This is largely an informal 
process and reminds us of the fact that European spatial planning has been characterised 
as involving learning where the force of the better argument counts. Clearly, this is 
something on which no definite conclusions can yet be drawn, but the concept of 
experimentalist governance could be of the utmost importance, a pointer to how 
governance generally might develop beyond the abstractions that representative 
democracy necessarily invokes. The implications are broad. Indeed, Sabel and Zeitlin 
(2010, 25) – both Americans – conclude that ‘[…] experimentalist governance cannot be 
experimentalist […] if it remains confined to the EU’. As with other issues, like the 
softening of border regimes thought to be specific to the EU, and the emergence of ‘soft 
spaces’ (Haughton, Allmendinger, Counssel, Vigar 2010) in its wake, it seems that 
European governance, including territorial governance, is of great significance. Another 
American EU watcher of repute, Jeremy Rifkin (2004, 225), has thus warned his 
countrymen that the European Union is the first governing experiment in a world 
metamorphosing from geographic planes to planetary fields. Conceivably, territorial 
cohesion policy might become part of the diffuse, but exciting message which the EU 
holds for the rest of the world.  
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